




















difficult	 to	 square	 with	 a	 conceptualist	 reading	 of	 Kant,	 according	 to	 which	
objective	perceptual	awareness	 requires	concepts.	Others	 take	Kant’s	views	on	
animals	to	imply	that	the	mental	life	of	animals	is	a	blooming,	buzzing	confusion.	
In	 this	 article	 I	 provide	 a	 historical	 reconstruction	 of	Kant’s	 views	 on	 animals,	
relating	them	to	eighteenth-century	debates	on	animal	cognition.	I	reconstruct	the	
views	 of	 Buffon	 and	 Reimarus	 and	 show	 that	 (i)	 both	 Buffon	 and	 Reimarus	
adopted	 a	 conceptualist	 position,	 according	 to	 which	 concepts	 structure	 the	
cognitive	experience	of	adult	humans,	and	(ii)	that	both	described	the	mental	life	
of	animals	as	a	blooming,	buzzing	confusion.	Kant’s	position,	I	argue,	is	virtually	
identical	 to	 that	 of	 Reimarus.	 Hence	 Kant’s	 views	 on	 animals	 support	 a	
conceptualist	 reading	 of	 Kant.	 The	 article	 further	 articulates	 the	 historical	
antecedents	 of	 the	 Kantian	 idea	 that	 concepts	 structure	 human	 cognitive	
experience	 and	 provides	 a	 novel	 account	 of	 how	 the	 ideas	 of	 similarity	 and	











discussed	 is	 the	 debate	 between	 conceptualist	 and	 non-conceptualist	
interpretations	of	Kant	(see	Hanna	2017	for	an	overview	of	the	debate).	According	
to	conceptualists,	objective	perceptual	awareness	requires	conceptual	capacities	
or	 the	 application	 of	 concepts.	 According	 to	 non-conceptualists,	 objective	
perceptual	 awareness	 requires	 only	 the	 sensory	 capacity	 for	 awareness	 of	





argues	 that	 Kant	 attributed	 objective	 perceptual	 awareness	 to	 animals,	 even	
though	 he	 denied	 them	 concepts,	 a	 position	 that	 does	 not	 square	 with	 a	




phrase,	 as	 a	blooming,	buzzing	 confusion”	 (McLear	2011,	p.	3).	 	On	 the	 second	
option,	the	proponent	of	conceptualism	entirely	denies	“to	non-discursive	beings	
the	 capacities	 for	 both	 objective	 perceptual	 awareness	 and	 mere	 sensory	
awareness”	(McLear	2011,	p.	4).	McLear	argues	that	both	positions	do	not	fit	the	
position	 of	 Kant	 and	 that	 there	 is	 space	 in	 Kant	 for	 a	 position	 that	 allows	 for	
objective	conscious	awareness	without	being	conceptual	in	nature.		
	 McLear’s	 position	 has	 recently	 been	 criticized	 by	 Fisher	 (2017).	 Fisher	
argues	that	according	to	Kant	all	representations	of	animals	are	obscure,	i.e.,	they	
are	 representations	 of	 which	 they	 are	 not	 conscious	 (Fisher	 2017,	 p.	 444).	
Moreover,	she	argues	that	the	mental	life	of	animals	is	characterized	by	disunity.	












	 Which	 one	 of	 these	 interpretations	 is	 correct?	 Both	 Mclear	 and	 Fisher	
provide	 excellent	 arguments	 but	 focus	 solely	 on	 Kant’s	 own	 statements	 on	




Kant’s	 views	 on	 animal	 cognition	 to	 eighteenth-century	 debates	 on	 animal	
cognition,	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 the	 views	 of	 Buffon	 and	 Reimarus.	 I	 argue	 that	
Kant’s	views	on	animals	were	hardly	original,	for	they	are	virtually	identical	to	the	





Fisher’s	 interpretation	 of	 Kant,	 who	 takes	 Kant	 to	 argue	 that	 all	 animal	
representations	 are	 obscure,	 is	 correct.	 Against	 McLear,	 we	 show	 that	 Kant	
describes	the	mental	life	of	animals	as	a	blooming	and	buzzing	confusion	and	that	
his	 views	 on	 animal	 cognition	 support	 rather	 than	 discredit	 a	 conceptualist	
reading	of	Kant.		
	 My	 historical	 reconstruction	 aims	 to	 make	 two	 more	 historical	
contributions.	First,	Kant	 is	often	credited	as	one	of	 the	 first	philosophers	who	
made	 the	 claim	 that	 concepts	 structure	 human	 (perceptual)	 experience.	 The	
historical	antecedents	of	this	idea	are	little	known.	I	show	that	in	their	discussion	
of	 animal	 cognition,	 both	Buffon	 and	Reimarus	 argued	 that	 concepts	 structure	
human	 experience.	 Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 differences	 between	 animals	 and	
humans	was	taken	to	be	that	the	cognitive	experience	of	humans	was	structured	
by	 concepts,	 whereas	 the	 cognitive	 experience	 of	 animals	 was	 not.	 Hence,	
eighteenth-century	 biological	 debates	 on	 animal	 cognition	 provide	 one	 of	 the	
possible	sources	for	the	idea	that	concepts	structure	human	experience.		





difference	 between	 animals	 and	 humans	 was	 taken	 to	 be	 based	 on	 a	 more	
fundamental	 contention:	 animals	 cannot,	 in	 contrast	 to	 humans,	 clearly	 and	
distinctly	cognize	similarities	and	differences.	This	fact	explains	why	the	mental	
life	of	animals	is	best	described	as	a	blooming	and	buzzing	confusion.	This	article	





influence	 between	 these	 authors	 or	 if	 there	 are	 only	 similarities	 (analogies)	





mention	 Buffon	 and	 Reimarus	 explicitly	 while	 also	 discussing	 their	 views	 on	




that	 makes	 it	 probable	 that	 Kant	 was	 familiar	 with	 the	 writings	 of	 Reimarus.	
However,	 even	 if	 we	 cannot	 establish	 the	 influence	 of	 Reimarus	 on	 Kant	with	
complete	certainty,	I	hope	to	show	that	discussing	Kant	in	the	context	of	Buffon	
and	 Reimarus	 provides	 fruitful	 insights	 into	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Kant,	 such	 as	
evidence	 for	 a	 conceptualist	 reading	 of	 Kant	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 Kant’s	 views	 on	
animal	cognition	are	highly	similar	to	those	of	Reimarus.			
	 The	structure	of	 this	article	 is	as	 follows.	 In	Section	2,	 I	discuss	how	the	
ideas	 of	 similarity	 and	 difference	 are	 used	 in	 present	 day	 debates	 on	 concept	
learning	in	animals.	This	exposition	provides	a	model	for	interpreting	the	views	of	
Buffon,	 Reimarus,	 and	 Kant,	who	 also	 took	 similarity	 and	 difference	 to	 be	 key	





content	 whereas	 animal	 representations	 do	 not.	 Section	 4	 and	 5	 provide	 a	
historical	reconstruction	of	the	views	on	animal	cognition	by	Reimarus.	I	describe	
Reimarus’	 views	 on	 the	 cognitive	 capacities	 of	 animals	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
psychological	writings	of	Wolff,	and	attribute	to	Reimarus	a	conceptualist	position	




















cars	 (ibid,	 p.	 15).	 The	 capacity	 for	 obtaining	 such	 concepts	 might	 perhaps	 be	
explained	in	terms	of	an	inborn	capacity	to	determine	perceptual	similarities	(ibid,	
p.	 17).	 The	members	 of	associative	 classes	 do	 not,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 perceptual	
classes,	share	common	characteristics.	As	an	example,	Zental	et.	al.	mention	the	
class	 consisting	of	 a	 chair,	 the	 spoken	word	 chair,	 and	 the	written	word	 chair.	
Here:	“the	basis	for	the	common	response	to	members	of	the	class	is	arbitrary	and	
associative”	 (ibid,	 p.	 19).	 Finally,	 relational	 classes	 also	 do	 not	 depend	 on	
perceptual	properties	of	stimuli,	but	involve	relationships	among	stimuli	(ibid,	p.	
25).	Sometimes	relational	classes	are	simply	called	abstract	(as	opposed	to	non-
abstract	 or	 natural)	 concepts	 (Katz	 &	 Wright	 2006).	 Within	 comparative	
psychology,	 important	 relational	 classes	 include	 sameness	 and	 difference	
(Wasserman	&	Young	2010;	Katz,	Wright	&	Bodily	2007).	
As	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 above	 account,	 the	 capacity	 to	 observe	 perceptual	
similarities	(in	the	case	of	perceptual	classes)	and	the	capacity	to	cognize	abstract	





were	based	on	a	more	 fundamental	 contention:	 that	animals	do	not	have	clear	




such	 as	 sameness	 (which	 animals	 lack).	 The	 third	 author	 I	 will	 discuss,	 Kant,	
adopted	 the	 position	 of	 Reimarus.	 These	 authors	 thus	 denied,	 in	 contrast	 to	
present	 day	 researchers,	 that	 animals	 have	 clear	 cognition	 of	 perceptual	

















uniformity	 of	 animal	 behavior	 suggested	 that	 it	 was	 the	 result	 of	 “pure	











These	 remarks	 raise	 multiple	 questions.	 What	 is	 the	 exact	 difference	
between	sensations	and	ideas?	What	is	so	special	about	ideas?	And,	what	is	the	
relation	between	comparison,	 reflection,	and	 ideas?	 It	 is	difficult	 to	definitively	
link	Buffon’s	 remarks	 to	 some	philosophical	 tradition.	The	Cartesians,	with	 the	
possible	 exception	 of	 Malebranche	 (Nadler	 1992),	 did	 not	 always	 strictly	
distinguish	between	sensations	and	ideas.	Buffon	is	often	regarded	as	a	follower	
of	Locke,	but	Locke	also	did	not	always	strictly	distinguish	sensations	from	ideas.		







influenced	 by	multiple	 authors,	 including	 Cartesians,	 Locke,	 Leibniz,	 and	many	
others.	Moreover,	Wolff’s	 philosophy	 and	 psychology	 itself	 incorporated	many	
Cartesian	 and	empiricist	 elements.	My	aim	 is	 thus	not	primarily	 to	 argue	 for	 a	
specific	influence	of	Wolff	on	Buffon,	but	to	sketch	a	theory	of	psychology	that	was	





considering).	 In	 the	 entry	 on	 “sensation”	 (1765),	 the	 anonymous	 author,	
criticizing	Locke,	notes	that	ideas	are	clear,	i.e.,	they	distinctively	“evoke	in	us	some	
object	that	is	not	us”	(Anonymous	1765).	By	contrast,	sensations	are	obscure,	they	
do	 not	 distinctly	 show	 us	 any	 object,	 and	 confused.	 The	 confused	 nature	 of	
sensations	is	linked	to	the	idea	that	sensations	are	complex:	they	consist	of	parts.	
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The	 author	 cites	 Newton’s	 prism	 experiments	 to	 support	 her	 view.	 These	
experiments	showed	that	there	are	“only	five	basic	colours”,	and	that	other	colors	
are	 complexes	 made	 up	 from	 basic	 colors	 (Ibid).	 Sensations	 are	 structured	
similarly:	sensations	of	complex	colors,	which	we	believe	are	simple,	are	actually	
complexes	 of	 small	 perceptions	 (of	 basic	 colors),	 which	 the	 mind	 cannot	
distinguish	from	one	another.	This	explains	why	sensations	are	confused.		






that	 ideas	 represent	 objects	 in	 a	 strong	 sense,	 or,	 using	 contemporary	
terminology,	that	these	representations	have	conceptual	content	(Siegel	2016).	An	




















i.e.,	 if	we	do	not	know	what	 is	represented,	 it	 is	obscure	(e.g.,	 the	perception	of	
“something	white”;	Wolff	[1719]	2003a,	p.	111).	Finally,	a	thought	is	distinct	if	we	




	 How	 do	 we	 obtain	 clear	 thoughts?	 For	 Wolff,	 clarity	 arises	 through	
recognizing	differences	between	 things	 (ibid,	112).	More	specifically,	we	have	a	




that	 sensations	 are	 transformed	 into	 thoughts	 through	 reflection	 and	memory	
(Wolff	 [1719]	 2003b,	 pp.	 467-468).	 For	 Wolff,	 reflection	 enables	 comparison:	
reflection	allows	us	to	focus	on	the	parts	of	a	thing	and	compare	it	with	its	other	
parts.	We	reflect,	for	example,	on	an	elm	if	we	focus	on	its	trunk,	leaves,	and	so	























the	 knowledge	 that	 animals	 have	 of	 objects	 is	 confused:	 they	 cannot	 clearly	
















reflect	 do	 not	 know	 what	 their	 sensations	 represent,	 i.e.,	 they	 have	 no	 clear	
thoughts	 and	 cannot	 clearly	 determine	 similarities	 and	 differences	 between	
objects.	The	life	of	people	who	do	not	reflect	is,	once	again,	a	blooming	and	buzzing	
confusion.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 for	 the	 mental	 life	 of	 animals.	 This	 life	 must	 be	
contrasted	 with	 the	 mental	 life	 of	 humans	 who	 reflect	 and	 employ	 concepts.	
Humans	with	concepts	have	clear	thoughts	of	objects,	i.e.,	they	clearly	know	the	














idea	 of	 succession,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 distance	 between	 successive	 ideas	
provides	us	with	the	idea	of	duration.	By	observing	appearances	at	regular	and	
equidistant	 periods,	 e.g.,	 the	 revolutions	 of	 the	 sun,	 which	 provide	 us	 with	 a	
constant	 alteration	 of	 ideas,	 we	 obtain	 ideas	 of	measures	 of	 duration,	 such	 as	
minutes,	hours,	and	so	forth.	Finally,	by	mentally	adding	these	measures	we	obtain	
temporal	ideas	such	as	tomorrow,	a	year,	eternity,	and	so	forth	(Locke	1690,	pp.	
408-446).	 To	 have	 temporal	 ideas	 thus	 requires	 heavy	 mental	 machinery:	
reflection	and	ideas	(concepts)	of	succession	and	duration.	Animals	have	none	of	
these	ideas	or	concepts,	and	hence	Buffon	concludes,	e.g.,	that	birds	have	no	idea	
of	 the	 future	or	of	 the	past	 	 (Buffon	 [1753]	1785,	p.	 298).	 Importantly,	 human	
memory	employs	temporal	ideas	or	concepts.	Buffon	makes	this	explicit	by	noting	
that	we	have	little	recollection	of	our	childhood,	which	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	







is	 distinct	 we	 do	 know	 these	 things,	 i.e.,	 we	 know	 what	we	 experienced,	 its	
intensity	(how	we	experienced	it),	and	for	how	long	we	experienced	it.	Buffon’s	
	 10	
concept	 of	memory	 thus	 somewhat	 resembles	our	modern	 concept	 of	 episodic	
memory,	 i.e,	 memory	 of	 what	 happened,	 where	 it	 happened,	 and	 when	 it	
happened	 (Tulving	 1972).	 Although	 Buffon	 denies	 that	 animals	 have	 such	 a	
memory,	since	they	 lack	 ideas	or	concepts,	 they	do	have	reminiscence,	which	 is	
explicable	in	terms	of	the	action	of	the	brain.	Reminiscence	is	merely	a	renewal	or	
renovation	of	“the	vibrations	of	the	inner	sense”	(Buffon	[1753]	1785,	p.	235),	a	
mere	association	of	 impressions	or	sensations	retained	 in	 the	 inner	sense.	This	
mechanical	memory	is	sufficient	to	explain	all	the	actions	of	animals	that	lead	us	
to	attribute	memory	to	animals.		
To	 conclude:	 what	 distinguishes	 animals	 from	 humans	 is	 that	 the	
representations	of	humans	have	conceptual	content.	Since	humans,	as	opposed	to	
animals,	 can	 compare	 things	 (reflect	 on	 things),	 they	 can	 spot	 similarities	 and	
differences	between	things	and	form	ideas	or	concepts.	Ideas	or	concepts,	in	turn,	






In	 the	 previous	 section	 we	 have	 seen	 how	 Buffon	 drew	 the	 human-animal	
boundary.	 In	 this	 and	 the	 following	 sections,	 we	will	 discuss	 how	 the	 human-
animal	boundary	was	drawn	by	Hermann	Samuel	Reimarus,	who	wrote	one	of	the	
more	influential	works	on	animal	instinct	in	the	late	eighteenth	century.		
Reimarus,	 who	 was	 Professor	 of	 Hebrew	 Oriental	 Languages	 at	 the	
academic	Gymnasium	of	Hamburg,	was	as	 internationally	renowned	scholar.	 In	
1754,	 he	 published	 his	 Die	 Vornehmsten	 Wahrheiten	 der	 Natũrlichen	 Religion,	
followed	by	his	logic,	the	so-called	Vernunftlehre,	in	1756.	In	1760	he	published	a	
work	on	animal	 instinct,	 the	Algemeine	Betrachtungen	über	die	Triebe	der	Tiere	
(hereafter:	Triebe).	The	 latter	works	were	translated	 in	multiple	 languages	and	
went	through	many	editions.	In	his	Triebe,	Reimarus	developed	his	fullest	account	
of	animal	behavior	and	cognition.	He	agreed	with	Buffon	that	animals	lack	reason.	












consistently	 explains	 the	 behavior	 of	 animals	 in	 terms	 of	 low-level	 cognitive	
mechanisms,	reasoning	that	if	the	behavior	of	animals	can	be	explained	in	terms	
of	 low-level	 cognitive	 mechanisms	 we	 need	 not	 attribute	 higher	 cognitive	
capacities	 (such	 as	 reason)	 to	 animals.	 In	 the	 following,	 we	 will	 discuss	 the	





all	 these	objects.	Attention	allows	us	 to	 isolate	and	 focus	on	a	single	object	and	
become	 aware	 of	 it	 (Reimarus	 1762,	 pp.	 17-18).	 According	 to	 Reimarus,	 the	
movements	of	animals	towards	specific	items,	the	turning	of	their	heads,	and	so	
forth,	suggested	that	animals	have	attention.		
Reimarus	 next	 discussed	 imagination.	 Imagination	 renews	 and	 connects	
past	representations	with	present	representations.	More	specifically,	imagination	
(involuntary)	 associates	 a	 representation	 that	 we	 have	 had	 in	 the	 past	 with	 a	
present	representation	(ibid.,	19-20).	Wolff	explained	this	process	in	terms	of	the	
following	 rule	 of	 association	 (Regel	 der	 Einbildungen):	 if	 a	 part	 of	 a	 present	
sensation	is	a	part	of	a	past	sensation,	we	imagine	the	past	sensation.	Thus,	 if	 I	
have	seen	Sarah	in	building	x	and	in	the	company	of	y	&	z	yesterday,	I	will	imagine	
x,	 y,	 and	 z	when	 I	 see	 Sarah	 today	 (Wolff	 [1719]	 2003a,	 p.	 132).	 According	 to	













on	 the	 “animal	 state	 of	 humans”,	 and	 he	 used	 human	 children	 as	 a	model	 for	
discussing	animal	cognition	(Reimarus	1762,	p.	25-26).	Reimarus	introduced	this	
rule	 after	 criticizing	 researchers	 who	 used	 analogies	 between	 the	 behavior	 of	
adult	 humans	 and	 animals	 to	 attribute	 complex	 cognitive	 abilities	 to	 animals.	
These	researchers	reasoned,	for	example,	as	follows:	animals	categorize	objects,	
humans	 categorize	 objects	 using	 concepts,	 hence	 animals	 have	 concepts.	 Such	




other	 more	 than	 animals	 and	 functioning	 adult	 people.	 The	 fact	 that	 animal	
behavior	 was	 modeled	 after	 the	 behavior	 of	 prereflective	 children	 provided	
another	 reasons	 for	 explaining	animal	behavior	 in	 terms	of	 low-level	 cognitive	
mechanisms.		
	 In	our	animal	state,	Reimarus	argued,	we	are	unable	to	remember	the	past	
as	being	 in	 the	past.	 In	 this	 state,	past	 representations	are	mixed	with	present	
representations	 and	 past	 and	 present	 are	 indistinguishable.	 Hence,	 the	 animal	
state	is	literally	a	confused	mix	of	(past	and	present)	representations.	Once	again,	
animal	life	can	be	understood	in	James’	terms	as	a	blooming	a	buzzing	confusion.			
The	 confusion	 of	 past	 and	 present	 representations	 happens	 in	 adult	
humans,	 for	 example,	when	we	 feel	 affection	 for	 a	 certain	 person	 because	 she	
resembles	another	person	we	know.	This	state	is	taken	to	be	common	to	animals	




imagination,	 as	 a	 faculty	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 know	 reflectively	 that	 we	 have	
previously	 had	 a	 thought	 (Wolff	 [1719]	 2003a,	 p.	 139).	 Like	 Buffon,	 Reimarus	
thinks	this	kind	of	explicit	memory	presupposes	reflection	and	the	application	of	
concepts	 and	pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	we	have	no	 recollection	of	 our	 childhood	
years	to	support	the	fact	that	children	(and	thus	animals)	lack	genuine	memory	
(Reimarus	1762,	pp.	28-29).		
Although	 animals	 lack	 genuine	 memory,	 they	 do	 have	 imagination.	
Imagination	explains	why	animals	behave	as	 if	they	have	memory	(ibid.,	p.	29).	
For	 example,	 the	 imagination	 of	 a	 dog	 will	 unconsciously	 mix	 present	




can	 be	 explained	 merely	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 associations	 of	 the	 imagination.	 The	
imagination	of	the	dog	is	analogous	to	human	memory,	but	nothing	more.		



















of	 individual	 objects	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 species	 will,	 because	 they	 share	
attributes,	be	similar.	This	explains	how	animals	categorize	objects	on	the	basis	of	
sensations	alone,	and	not,	 like	humans,	on	the	basis	of	concepts.	Let	me	give	an	











brood	 on	 chalk	 (Reimarus	 1762,	 p.	 37).	 This	 example	 shows,	 according	 to	
Reimarus,	 that	 if	 different	 objects	 occasion	 the	 same	 sensible	 impressions	 in	
animals,	the	animals	will	treat	these	objects	as	being	the	same	(ibid.,	p.	33).	He	




does	not	provide	proof	 for	having	 concepts.	Rather,	 having	 a	 concept	 “permits	
different	response	to	identical	stimuli”	(cited	in	Andrews	2016).	For	example,	ants	
recognize	dead	conspecifics	on	the	basis	of	stimuli	of	oleic	acid,	but	do	not	have	a	
concept	 of	 death	 since	 their	 behavior	 is	mediated	only	 by	 stimuli	 of	 oleic	 acid	
(Allen	 &	 Hauser	 1991,	 p.	 231).	 Humans,	 however,	 employ	multiple	 stimuli	 as	
evidence	for	death	and	can	modify	what	counts	as	evidence	for	treating	something	
as	dead.	According	to	Allen	&	Hauser,	 this	 flexible	behavior	 is	accounted	for	by	
having	concepts:	humans	have	a	concept	of	death	because	they	“have	an	internal	
representation	of	death	 that	 is	distinct	 from	 the	perceptual	 information	 that	 is	











do	 not	 have	 experiences	 with	 conceptual	 content.	 We	 have	 further	 seen	 that	
within	the	Wolffian	philosophy	to	have	a	concept	of	A	entails	that	we	represent	A	
as	 A.	 Moreover,	 having	 concepts	 presupposes	 the	 faculty	 of	 reflection	 or	
comparison.	In	his	Triebe,	Reimarus	adopts	this	Wolffian	picture.	He	argues	that	
in	 order	 to	 have	 concepts,	 i.e.,	 to	 know	what	we	 represent,	 we	must	 compare	
individual	objects	and	obtain	knowledge	of	similarities	and	differences	between	





knowledge	 of	 similarity	 a	 form	 of	 universal	 knowledge?	 What	 is,	 exactly,	
knowledge	of	similarity	and	how	is	it	obtained?		To	answer	these	questions,	we	
must	 consider	Reimarus’	 views	on	 the	 formation	of	 concepts	 articulated	 in	his	
logic	 or	Vernunftlehre	 (1755).	 By	 doing	 so,	 we	will	 understand	why	 Reimarus	
argues	 that	knowledge	of	similarity	 is	 itself	a	 form	of	universal	and	conceptual	
knowledge,	and	can	thus	not	be	ascribed	to	animals.				
In	his	logic,	Reimarus	provides	an	extensive	account	of	concept	formation.	
This	 account	 runs	 as	 follows	 (Reimarus	 1766,	 pp.	 23-34):	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	
concepts,	humans	require,	firstly,	healthy	sensory	organs	that	obtain	impressions	
of	external	objects.	This	provides	humans	with	 indistinct	 impressions	of	all	 the	
objects	 that	 affect	 their	 organs.	 Through	attention	we	 subsequently	 focus	 on	 a	
single	object	or	part	of	our	perceptual	field	(e.g.,	the	letter	A).	When	attending	to	
a	single	object,	imagination	and	memory	provide	us	with	representations	of	past	
objects	 that	are	similar	 to	 the	object	we	presently	perceive	 (e.g.,	other	 letters).	
After	 this,	we	reflect,	 i.e.,	we	compare	 the	present	and	past	objects,	 in	order	 to	
determine	whether	these	objects	are	similar	or	different.	Importantly,	Reimarus	
argues	 that	 this	 requires	 that	 we	 apply	 abstract	 metaphysical	 principles:	 the	
principle	 of	 identity	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 non-contradiction.	 It	 is	 only	 after	 this	
reflective	 process,	 that	 we	 properly	 have	 a	 sensation	 of	 the	 similarities	 and	
differences	between	things.	We	can	then	combine	similar	things	(e.g.,	various	A’s),	
distinguish	 them	 from	 different	 things	 (e.g.,	 B’s,	 C’s,	 etc.),	 and	 obtain	 one	







and	 other	 letters	 B.	 Knowledge	 of	 similarity	 and	 difference	 is	 not,	 however,	
something	that	 is	given	 through	the	senses.	 In	 fact,	Reimarus	says	that	we	only	
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We	 can	 understand	 these	 strong	 claims	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 notion	 of	
similarity	that	is	invoked.	According	to	Wolff,	two	things	are	similar	if	that	which	
determines	 their	kind	 is	 the	 same,	 and	 they	are	different	 if	 this	 is	not	 the	 case	
(Wolff	 [1719]	2003a,	p.	10).	Thus,	 for	example,	we	know	 that	 two	humans	are	

















animals	 have	 clear	 cognition	 of	 perceptual	 similarities	 and	 differences.	 Such	







to	 animals	 an	 obscure	 and	 confused	 sensible	 representation	 of	 similarity.	 This	
corresponds	 to	 what	 Wolff,	 in	 his	 empirical	 psychology,	 calls	 the	 identity	 of	
sensations	 (Wolff	 [1732]	1968,	 p.	 50):	 the	 same	or	 similar	 objects	provide	 the	
same	 or	 similar	 impressions.	 	 However,	 according	 to	 Reimarus	 similar	
impressions	taken	by	themselves	are	obscure	and	confused.	Hence,	the	cognition	
of	similarity	that	animals	have	is	obscure	and	confused	as	opposed	to	the	clear	and	
distinct	 knowledge	 of	 similarity	 that	 humans	 have.	 In	 other	 words,	 similar	
impressions	are	not	sufficient	for	us	to	know	that	objects	are	similar	or	different.	
















is	able	 to	 form	clear	representations	of	 the	village,	 the	 forest,	and	the	river.	To	
















Was	 Kant	 aware	 of	 developments	 in	 eighteenth-century	 biological	 debates	 on	
animal	cognition?	We	know	that	Kant	was	familiar	with	some	of	the	writings	of	
Buffon,	since	he	gave	a	course	called	“Physical	Geography”	that	closely	followed	
the	 path	 taken	 by	 Buffon	 in	 his	 natural	 history	 (Mensch	 2013).	 Moreover,	
throughout	 the	 published	 writings	 of	 Kant	 there	 are	 numerous	 references	 to	
Buffon’s	work	(see	for	a	reference	to	Buffon’s	species	concept	Kant	1902-,	Ak	2,	p.	
115).	 However,	 there	 are	 no	 passages	 in	 Kant	 that	 directly	 discusses	 Buffon’s	
views	 on	 animal	 cognition,	 so	 Kant’s	 familiarity	 with	 these	 views	 remains	
uncertain.	
There	 is	more	 evidence	 that	Kant	was	 familiar	with	Reimarus’	writings,	
although	 the	 evidence	 is	 often	 indirect.	 Kant	 knew	Reimarus’	Die	Vornehmsten	
Wahrheiten	 der	 Natũrlichen	 Religion	 (1754),	 a	 work	 which	 he	 praised	 in	 the	
Critique	 of	 Judgment	 (Kant	 1902-,	 Ak	 5,	 p.	 476),	 and	 there	 are	 references	 to	
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Reimarus’	writings	on	logic	in	his	published	writings	(Kant	1902-,	Ak	2,	p.	191).	
With	 two	 possible	 exceptions,	 there	 are,	 as	 far	 as	 I	 know,	 no	 references	 to	





Erläuterung	der	 zehenten	Capitels	 (1762).4		This	was	an	appendix	 to	Reimarus’	
(second	edition	of	 the)	Triebe,	which	 contained	an	explanation	of	 the	basics	of	
Reimarus’	 theory	 of	 drives	 and,	 importantly,	 the	 denial	 that	 animals	 possess	
concepts	(Reimarus	1762,	Anhang,	p.	44).	This	also	provides	evidence	for	the	fact	
that	Kant	was	familiar	with	Reimarus’	views.	Kant	also	certainly	knew	Reimarus	
indirectly.	 In	 his	 Philosophische	 Versuche	 (1777),	 which	 Kant	 read,	 Tetens	
discusses	Reimarus’	views	when	discussing	animal	souls	(Tetens	1777,	pp.	742-
752).	 Finally,	 there	 is	 some	 important	 terminological	 evidence.	 In	 the	Religion	
Innerhalb	der	Grenzen	der	bloβen	Vernunft	(Kant	1902-,	Ak	6,	p.	28),	Kant	uses	the	
term	Kunsttrieb	to	designate	animal	instincts,	a	term	that	was,	as	far	as	I	know,	
introduced	 in	 the	 philosophical	 vocabulary	 by	 Reimarus.	 Kant’s	 lectures	 on	




	 A	 core	 feature	of	Reimarus’	 theory	of	 animal	 cognition	was,	 as	we	have	
seen,	 his	 attempt	 to	 explain	 complex	 animal	 behavior	 in	 terms	 of	 low-level	
cognitive	mechanisms.	Thus,	for	example,	Reimarus	argued	that	animals	use	low-
level	cognitive	mechanisms	such	as	imagination	to	perform	complex	tasks	such	as	






of	 Judgment	 (1790),	Kant	noted	 that	 the	 ground	of	 the	 ‘artful’	 constructions	of	













Thus,	 in	 comparing	 the	 artistic	 actions	 of	 animals	 with	 those	 of	 human	 beings,	 we	










p.	 135).	 This	 suggests	 that	 Kant	 denied	 that	 animals	 have	 clear	 thoughts,	 i.e.,	
thoughts	 through	which	we	 clearly	 know	what	 is	 represented.	 This	 reading	 is	
confirmed	by	the	fact	that	Kant	sometimes	explains	what	it	means	to	have	obscure	
representations	 by	 noting	 that	 if	 one	 has	 obscure	 representations	 one	 is	 not	
conscious	of	them	(Kant	1902-,	Ak	25,	p.	479).	Fisher	(2017,	p.	454)	has	explained	
what	 Kant	 means	 with	 consciousness	 here.	 In	 a	 Reflexion	 Kant	 states:	 “To	 be	
conscious	of	a	representation	is:	to	know	that	one	has	this	representation,	i.e.:	to	
distinguish	this	representation	from	the	other”	(Kant	1902-,	Ak	16,	p.	80).	Hence,	
if	 one	 has	 obscure	 representations,	 i.e.,	 if	 one	 is	 not	 conscious	 of	 this	
representation,	we	lack	insight	into	similarities	and	differences	between	objects.	
By	describing	the	representations	of	animals	as	obscure	Kant	thus	clearly	adopts	























Animals	 clearly	 represent	 objects	 (the	 lowest	 degree	 of	 cognition)	 but	 do	 not	
cognize	through	concepts.	What	about	the	second	level	of	cognition,	i.e.,	the	level	
of	percipere?	Kant	claims	that	to	cognize	something	with	consciousness	is	to	have	
insight	 into	 identity	 or	 diversity,	 i.e.,	 into	 similarities	 and	 differences	 between	
objects.	 Kant	 argues	 that	 animals	 cognize	 objects	 but	 without	 consciousness,	
which	suggests	that	they	have	some	kind	of	cognition	of	similarity	and	difference	
but	are	not	conscious	of	similarity	and	difference.		
This	 position,	 in	 my	 view,	 is	 a	 nice	 restatement	 of	 Reimarus’	 views	 on	
similarity	 and	 difference.	 Recall	 that	 animals,	 according	 to	 Reimarus,	 have	 an	
obscure	sensible	representation	of	similarity	and	difference.	Thus,	to	repeat	my	




is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 confused	 cognition	 of	 similarity	 that	 animals	 categorize	
objects.	However,	this	confused	cognition	of	similarity	is	quite	different	from	the	
clear	 and	 explicit	 knowledge	 that	 humans	 have	 of	 similarity	 and	 difference:	
humans	clearly	recognize	that	an	object	x	is	similar	to	object	y	and	different	from	
object	 z.	 They	 have	 abstract	 universal	 knowledge	 of	 such	 facts	 and	 can	 often	







is	 characterized	 by	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 experience	 whereas	 animal	
experience	is	not	conceptually	structured.	 	Can	such	a	conceptualist	position	be	
discerned	 in	Kant’s	remarks	on	animals?	 In	a	1789	 letter	 to	Marcus	Herz,	Kant	







	 Experiences,	 namely,	 are	 not	 mere	 concepts	 and	 representations	 but	 also	
judgments	 [;]	e.g.,	 the	representation	of	warmth	or	of	cold	are	concepts	of	experience.	


















Kant’s	 views	 on	 animals	 have	 been	 debated	 by	 conceptualist	 and	 non-
conceptualist	 interpreters	of	Kant.	According	 to	non-conceptualist	 interpreters,	
Kant	 ascribed	 to	 animals	 the	 capacity	 for	 objective	 perceptual	 awareness,	
although	he	denied	them	concepts.	According	to	conceptualist	interpreters,	Kant	











and	 Reimarus	 endorsed	 the	 view	 that	 concepts	 structure	 (human)	 cognitive	
experience.	Hence,	 I	show	that	eighteenth-century	biological	debates	on	animal	
cognition	 are	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 history	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 concepts	
structure	human	experience.	Finally,	I	have	provided	a	novel	account	of	how	the	




be	 based	 on	 a	 more	 fundamental	 difference:	 animals	 cannot,	 in	 contrast	 to	
humans,	 clearly	 and	 distinctly	 cognize	 similarities	 and	 differences.	 This	 fact	
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